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Education Freedom PAC v. Reid, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (June 28, 2022) 1
STATUTORY LIMITS: APPLICABILITY OF NRS 295.061 IN PROPOSED
INITIATIVES FOR LEGISLATIVE BALLOTS
Summary
This appeal comes from a district court order enjoining an initiative petition’s circulation
and the initiative’s placement on the ballot. In an opinion drafted by Justice Hardesty, the Court
considered whether the district court properly denied EFP’s request to dismiss the complaint
because the district court had not set the matter for a hearing within 15 days. The Court
acknowledges that, under the Nevada Constitution, an initiative petition cannot require
appropriations or expenditures, must adequately inform potential signatories about the petition’s
goal, and cannot invade the Legislature’s primary role of proposing and enacting laws. The Court
concluded that that the initiative at hand failed to satisfy all three requirements and that the
district court properly enjoined respondent Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the
ballot and properly declined to dismiss the complaint despite not having set the hearing within
that time frame.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant Education Freedom PAC (EFP) sought to place an initiative on the ballot that
would amend the Nevada Constitution to require the Legislature to establish education freedom
accounts for parents to use to pay for their child’s education if their child is educated outside of
the uniform system of common schools. However, Respondents Reid and Rogers (collectively
referred to as Reid) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the
initiative in the district court. EFP intervened and filed an answer and a brief challenging the
district court’s authority to hear the matter given that no hearing had been set within 15 days, as
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is required by Nevada statutory law. After the initial order, the district court entered another
order enjoining EFP from circulating the initiative petition for signatures and enjoining
respondent from including the initiative on the ballot. The district court came to the conclusion
that the dismissal was unnecessary because the hearing was expedited to the best of the court’s
ability and because the initiative was invalid for three reasons: (1) the initiative is an unfunded
mandate, (2) the description of the effect is legally misleading and contains a material omission,
and (3) the initiative violates the Nevada Legislature’s inherent deliberative functions by
commanding the Legislature to enact certain laws. EFP then brought this matter on appeal.
Discussion
The district court properly denied EFP’s request to dismiss
The Court began by considering whether the district court properly denied EFP’s request
to dismiss the complaint because the district court had not set the matter for hearing within 15
days. The Court relied on NRS 295.061, which requires that a party file a complaint challenging
an initiative petitions description of effect no later than fifteen days after the petition is filed with
the Secretary of State, which Reid did, in fact, do.2 The Court further relied on past precedent
that states “when a statutory time limit is material, it should be construed as mandatory unless
the legislature intended otherwise.”3 The Court used Village League to conclude that the statute’s
time requirements were directory, despite the statute’s use of the term “shall.”4 Here, under NRS
295.061(1), the court had fifteen days after Reid filed the February 22 complaint to set a hearing,
and the court did not do so. Instead, after the matter was assigned to Senior Judge McGee, he
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promptly entered an order, twenty-nine days after the complaint was filed, directing the court
clerk to set a hearing for the next week. The next day, the matter was set for a hearing on March
29. The Court further claimed that the statute’s legislative history is instructive and demonstrates
that legislators wanted to ensure that courts still had an adequate opportunity to properly vet
challenges to initiatives just that the courts do so on a priority basis. Next, the Court affirmed
that public policy supports the conclusion that the hearing-setting requirement is directory.
Although the Court concluded that the hearing-setting requirement in NRS 295.061(1) is not
mandatory, it nonetheless emphasized that district courts must make every effort to comply with
the expedited, statutory time frame for considering initiative challenges because “initiative
deadlines in general are relatively short, the district court must expedite any challenges to an
initiative.”5 Here, special circumstances prevented the district court from timely setting the
hearing, and the district court set the hearing as quickly as those circumstances permitted and
without excessive delay. Accordingly, because the fifteen-day requirement for setting the hearing
is directory, and considering the special circumstances of this case, the Court ruled that the
district court did not err in denying EFP's request to dismiss the complaint.
The district court properly enjoined the EFP initiative’s circulation and placement on the
ballot
The Court considered the district court's decision to enjoin the circulation of the initiative
petition for signatures and to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the
ballot. Thus, the Court reviewed this matter de novo.6
The initiative fails to comply with constitutional requirements
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EFP argued that its initiative did not need to comply with Article 19, Section 6 of the
Nevada Constitution regarding unfunded mandates, and regardless, it complied with that section
because the initiative does not include any expenditures or appropriations and leaves it to the
Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts.
All initiatives must comply with Article 19, Section 6
EFP further contended that it did not have to comply with the requirement to
include funding provisions because it proposed only a constitutional change. The Court,
however, disagreed on the basis that Article 19, Section 2 of the Nevada Constitution
provides that “subject to the limitations of Section 6 of this Article, the people reserve to
themselves the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to this
constitution, and to enact or reject them at the polls.”7 They also relied on Section 6, which
provides that Article 19 “does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory
amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money,
unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the
Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue.”8
Using these two sections and past case precedent, the Court analyzed the plain meeting of
the constitutional provision before considering the “history, public policy and reason for
the provision.”9 Stating that a constitutional provision is ambiguous if “it is susceptible to
two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations,” the Court concluded that Section
6 is ambiguous because it conflicts internally with Section 2, which “is exactly what
7
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Article 19, Section 6 aims to avoid.”10 Therefore, the Court concluded that all initiative
petitions must comply with Article 19, Section 6’s requirement that initiatives requiring
expenditures or appropriations contain a funding provision.
EFP’s initiative is an unfunded mandate
EFP argued that the initiative does not require money to be taken from the
treasury and instead only requires the Legislature to make an appropriation after enacting
laws to effectuate the education freedom accounts. Because the initiative does not include
any explicit expenditure or appropriation, EFP contended it did not need to include a
funding provision.
The Court then recognized that an initiative that “makes an appropriation
or requires an expenditure of money” is void if it does not also provide for the necessary
revenue.11 The Court concluded that the initiative does not comply with Article 19,
Section 6 because it creates a new requirement for the appropriation of state funding that
does not now exist and provides no discretion to the Legislature about whether to
appropriate or expend the money. Thus, the Court determined that the district court
properly found it to be void.
The description of effect is misleading
The district court determined that the initiative's failure to comply with
Article 19, Section 6 is not the only reason it is void. It concluded that EFP also failed to
provide an adequate description of effect for the initiative. The Court here agreed with this
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description of effect analysis, as used in Education Initiative PAC.12 The Court concluded
that because the initiative petition does not include its own funding source, the description
of effect is misleading about the impact the proposed change would have on the state's
budget. Thus, it found that the district court properly determined that these deficiencies
render the initiative void.
The initiative impedes the Legislature’s deliberative function
EFP contended that because there are numerous constitutional provisions
directing the Legislature to enact laws to effectuate those provisions, an initiative petition
proposing a constitutional amendment that directs the Legislature to enact laws is not
improper. Thus, EFP further argued that the district court erred in concluding that the
initiative petition was void because it would impair the Legislature's inherent deliberative
function. The Court here however concluded the opposite, by determining whether Reid’s
challenge to the initiative is proper for consideration pre-election. The Court primarily
relied on their holding in Herbst Gaming to acknowledge that there are two types of
challenges to an initiative that are appropriate: (1) those based on an argument that the
initiative did not meet the procedural requirements for placing an initiative on the ballot,
and (2) those based on a contention that “the subject matter is not appropriate for direct
legislation under constitutional or statutory limits on the initiative power.”13
As the Court explained in Herbst Gaming, and as relevant here, there are
two types of challenges to an initiative that are appropriate for pre-election consideration:
(1) those based on an argument that the initiative did not meet the procedural
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requirements for placing an initiative on the ballot, and (2) those based on a contention
that “the subject matter is not appropriate for direct legislation under constitutional or
statutory limits on the initiative power.”14 Using this precedent, the Court concluded that
because Reid's challenge is based on the idea that the Legislature itself would not be
permitted to enact the change proposed in the initiative, his challenge falls under the
second type of permitted challenge. The Court found that the initiative impedes the
Legislature’s inherent discretion in adopting or amending laws and places an unclear
change in front of the electorate by not providing how the proposed change will be
effectuated. The Court used this analysis to conclude that the district court properly
declared the initiative void as impairing the Legislature’s deliberative function.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying EFP's request to dismiss
Reid's challenge to the initiative petition based on the court's noncompliance with NRS
295.061(l)'s fifteen-day hearing-setting requirement, as that requirement is directory rather than
mandatory, and that the district court did not err in enjoining the circulation of the initiative
petition or in enjoining the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. The Court
determined that the initiative is void and the district court’s injunction was affirmed.
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Concurrence in part; dissent in part
However, Justice Herndon and Justice Pickering delivered a concurrence in part and
dissent in part, claiming that the funding mandate did not apply, and that the description of effect
was sufficient in explaining the initiative’s goal.

